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Abstract: Industrial sector technology growth must be understood in the context of the 
international technology development. We study South African manufacturing industries 
and let the US represent the world technology frontier. The industrial sector linkages 
between domestic and frontier technology shocks are estimated using panel-data for the 
period 1970 – 1995. The results show that industrial performance in South Africa is 
related to the world technology frontier and consequently existing studies of technology 
overlooking the international context have omitted variable bias. We find that South 
Africa industries respond to the technology gap to the US, but that the industries are 
lagging behind. The analysis explains prolonged stagnation in this middle income country 
and rejects catching up to the frontier. 
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The recent literature on technology growth has set the focus towards international 
technology spillovers. Lucas (2007) argues that the world growth pattern must be 
understood as cross-country flows of production-related knowledge from the successful 
economies to the less successful ones. We contribute to the empirical literature of 
technology growth by analyzing how the industry specific technological shocks in South 
Africa (SA) are correlated with technological shocks in the corresponding industries at 
the world technology frontier, here the US. 
 
The analysis of the industrial sector technology spillover shocks is related to recent 
analyses of spillovers and border effects. A few studies link industrial sector productivity 
growth to the world technology frontier, notably Cameron et al. (2005) for UK industries 
and Cameron (2005) for Japan. We suggest a more general error correction model to 
identify the effect of the frontier and apply the measurement of technology shocks 
analyzed by Basu et al. (2006, from now on called BFK). The analysis of a middle 
income country, South Africa, allows for an investigation of the industrial development 
far from the technology frontier. Vigfusson (2008) analyzes how productivity 
fluctuations are industry specific versus how much are country specific using data on 
manufacturing industries in Canada and the United States. He shows that cross-border 
pairings of the same industries are often highly correlated. As will come clear, we apply 
his method of identification of scale effects in the measurement of technology shocks.  
 
Our representation of the world technology frontier is the technology indexes estimated 
by BFK for US industries. On the South African side we use the TIPS (Trade and 
Industry Policy Strategies) panel data set of manufacturing industries during 1970-1995 
(TIPS, 2004). We follow the approach of BFK and estimate the growth in the technology 
indexes from a production function allowing for imperfect competition, non-constant 
returns to scale and changes in capacity utilization. We show that our estimations are 
robust to the alternative standard multi factor productivity measures for South Africa and 
the US.  Aghion et al. (2008) use similar industrial sector data for South Africa in a 3 
 
broader analysis of the determinants of a more conventional measure of total factor 
productivity. Their contribution is an investigation of hypotheses from new trade and 
growth theory. We have a more narrow focus in the identification of the role of the world 
frontier and avoid including other factors that have potential endogeneity problems. 
 
Our main result is that industry sector technology shocks in SA are influenced by 
technology shocks in corresponding US industries, but that the SA industries are not 
catching up to the US. It follows that productivity studies excluding the world technology 
frontier have an omitted variable problem. Individual country industrial sector growth 
cannot be understood independent of the technological frontier. The whole field of 
country oriented industrial productivity analysis has had the focus on country 
determinants, but our study shows that these studies miss out that industries are part of a 
global industrial development. You have to look abroad to understand industrial 
productivity growth.  
 
South Africa is taking benefit of the world technology frontier, but is also lagging behind. 
When we estimate the relationship between technology shocks and the technology gap in 
line with Cameron et al. (2005) and Cameron (2005), we find slow adjustment response 
to the gap. Long run equilibrium with equal growth rates between industries in SA and 
the US is rejected. The results indicate that about 25 % of frontier growth is absorbed in 
South Africa. This rejection of an equilibrium gap implies technology growth divergence. 
South African industries experience prolonged stagnation instead of catching up. 
 
The result is inconsistent with the more optimistic literature on international spillovers 
(see overview article by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 2005). The broader understanding 
of catching up often is called the Veblen-Gerschenkron-effect, with more rapid 
technological growth in the follower to close the technology gap to the leader.
1 
                                                 
1 This growth model was first formalized by Nelson and Phelps (1966), and modern restatements include Aghion and 
Howitt (2005), Ngai (2004), and Parente and Prescott (1994, 2004). Cross-country evidence about the importance of 
the world technology frontier is supplied by Benhabib and Spiegel (1994, 2005), Bernard and Jones (1996), Caselli and 
Coleman (2006), Comin and Hobijn (2004), and Griffith et al. (2004). 4 
 
According to this literature divergence and lagging behind can be understood as 
movement to a low-equilibrium growth or as the result of worsening barriers to 
technology adoption. Benhabib and Spiegel (2004) show the dynamics of divergence, but 
this low-equilibrium story looks less realistic for South Africa. It seems reasonable to 
assume that lagging behind is the result of shifting barriers affected by trade protection, 
limited human capital and/or domestic market conditions. Harding and Rattsø (2009) 
investigate the trade policy effect in SA using identification based on multilateral reform 
and find that protection may explain some of the productivity stagnation. Aghion et al. 
(2008) investigate broader mechanisms of trade and growth in SA based on recent 
theoretical innovations. Their results indicate that competition may be important for the 
foreign channel, which is consistent with the analysis of domestic competition conditions 
in SA by Aghion et al. (2006).  
 
Individual country productivity analysis typically concentrates on domestic determinants, 
possibly including foreign trade and foreign investment as explanatory factors. Recent 
prominent examples include Ferreira and Rossi (2003) and Alcala and Ciccone (2004). 
The determinants of industrial sector productivity often describe production conditions 
that themselves respond to productivity. Our analysis of correlation of technology shocks 
across borders represents an answer to the econometric challenges of the existing 
literature. The world technology frontier can plausibly be treated as exogenous for middle 
income countries like South Africa. In the analysis below, unobservable factors 
potentially important for productivity developments are accounted for by sector and year 
fixed effects. We do not claim that the correlation of technology shocks necessarily is a 
causal effect of the technology frontier. It can be argued that the US and South Africa 
have experienced common technology shocks that explain the correlation. This 
interpretation does not threaten our conclusion that the productivity development must be 
understood in the international context.  
 
Section 2 presents data, methodology and estimates of technology shocks, and 
econometric approach. The estimated effects of the world technology frontier are shown 
in section 3. Concluding remarks are offered in section 4. 5 
 
2. Data and estimation of technology shocks 
 
The analysis relates measures of industrial productivity in South Africa and the world 
technology frontier represented by the US manufacturing sectors. Our starting point is the 
BFK estimation of technological change for 21 US manufacturing sectors for the period 
1949-1996.
 Their estimation of technology shocks goes beyond the crude Solow residual 
as they also take into account sector specific returns to scale, imperfect competition and 
capacity utilization. They find that their measure has about half the variation of the plain 
Solow residual. We let the technology growth series provided by BFK represent 
technology shocks on the frontier. 
 
We establish a similar South African industrial panel of manufacturing sectors covered 
by the TIPS (Trade and Industry Policy Strategies, 2004).
2  The South African data 
contain yearly gross output (X), value added (Y), materials (M), capital (K), labor (L), 
labor and capital compensation, energy usage (E) and a measure of capacity utilization (U) 
for the period. To measure technology shocks in the South African manufacturing sectors 
we estimate a production function similar to BFK and Vigfusson (2008). We focus on the 
period 1971-1995, as data for years after 1996 are of questionable quality since the last 
manufacturing survey was undertaken in 1996 BFK estimate over 47 years, while 
Vigfusson estimates over 36 and we estimate over 25 years.
3  
 
The variables used in the analysis are documented in appendix Table 1. Growth rates are 
reported for output (dy), capital input (dk), labor input (dl) and materials input (dm). 
Aggregate input growth is measured by dx. Output and aggregate input have average 
annual growth over the 480 observations of about 2.7 %. The capacity utilization U is 
reported from the TIPS dataset with percentage point change dU.  
 
                                                 
2 The 28 manufacturing sectors in the TIPS dataset is aggregated to the same 21 sectors as used by BFK. The petroleum 
sector is excluded due to lack of data for many years and we end up with 20 sectors. 
3 Given the last manufacturing survey of 1996 we have prolonged the data series to 2003 and have extended the US 
dataset accordingly. The estimates using this longer dataset are similar to the results reported below. 6 
 
In the estimation of the production functions we use three factors (K, L, and M) as BFK. 
The BFK method addresses two important challenges. The first is to take into account the 
effect of changing capacity utilization. While BFK make use of hours worked by 
employees, we employ a direct measure of capacity utilization provided in the TIPS-
dataset. In a robustness check we use growth in electricity consumption as suggested by 
Vigfusson (data on hours worked are missing in our dataset).  
 
The other challenge is the handling of scale. Whereas BFK estimate sector specific 
returns to scale parameters, Vigfusson restricts his scale parameters to vary only between 
durable and non-durable sectors. Both BFK and Vigfusson let the capacity utilization 
coefficient vary only between durable and non-durable sectors. We choose to follow 
Vigfusson and consequently estimate only four parameters (capacity utilization and scale 
across the two types of sectors). Although the results of BFK (see their table 1) point to 
relatively large differences between sectors regarding the scale parameters, we see our 
simplified representation as an improvement compared to the standard procedure. 
Ferreira and Rossi (2003), for instance, assume equal marginal products of the inputs 
across all sectors. As we include sector fixed effects in the estimations, we feel more 
comfortable with this approach than estimating factor shares individually per sector. The 
latter would imply rather few observations to determine the parameters.   
 
Following BFK, the production function of gross output Yit in sector i in year t can be 
specified as: 
 




it it Z M L U K U F Y =         ( 1 )  
 
M is intermediate inputs, K is capital, L is labor, U
K and U
L indicates capacity utilization 
for capital and labor, respectively, and Z is a technology index. BFK show that the 
growth in the technology index, dz, can be estimated by:
4  
                                                 
4   Output growth can be expressed as: () it j it it it dy dx du dz γ = ++ , where dx is defined as in (4) and 
,,
K L
it K it it L it it du s du s du =+ . For constant returns to scale/perf. comp. and no utilization changes, dz equals the standard 
Solow residual, i.e. growth in multifactor productivity:   it it it it dz dmfp dy dx = =− 7 
 
 
ii t i it it i it dy dx du c dz γ β =++ + ,         ( 2 )  
 
Where dy and dx is growth in output and input, respectively. du is growth in capacity 
utilization, capturing the capacity utilization of both capital and labor. c is a sector-
specific constant capturing a sector specific trend. As Vigfusson we specify the 
relationship on first differenced log form and estimate 
 
it j it j it i it dy dx du c dz γ β =++ + ,             (3) 
 
Where j indicates durables versus non-durables, and  
 
,,, it K it it L it it M it it dx s dk s dl s dm =+ +,         ( 4 )  
    




Input growth, dx, may be correlated with the technology growth and estimating (3) with 
OLS could give biased estimates of the scale parameter. We therefore instrument dx in 
equation (3). We directly employ BFK’s instruments, which are lagged oil price shocks, 
lagged US monetary shock and lagged US military spending (see BFK for explanation 
and data). Especially oil price shocks are found to be a good predictor in the South 
African case as well. To reduce potential problems of weak instruments we also add 
current gold price, measured in USD as an instrument in our main specification. In 
alternative formulations we use current platinum price as an additional instrument. The 
intuition behind the BFK instruments are that these are important business cycle 
characteristics affecting inputs, but not technology. The same argument goes for the 
                                                 
5 For South Africa we do only have the manufacturing panel in 1995-prices. Theory suggests that the value shares 
should be measured in current prices. Our wage bill and capital compensation bill is now deflated with output prices, 
and only if wage and capital compensation inflation differ from output price inflation our wages would be different 
from the ones calculated with current prices. BFK use average factor shares over their whole period, we chose a time 
series of factor shares. We believe that none of these two differences affect our results as the results are robust to 
technology measures from production functions with estimated factor shares, 8 
 
prices of gold and platinum. These are arguably determined at the world market, but are 
correlated with input use in South Africa as these are important metals for South Africa. 
For all of these instruments, it seems reasonable, for given capacity utilization, that they 
affect gross output only through inputs and not directly or through technology. The 
exclusion restriction therefore seems to be plausibly satisfied. In contrast to BFK and 
Vigfusson, we prefer to use the cleaner 2SLS approach rather than the less transparent 
GMM-procedures they are using. The instruments data are documented in Appendix 
Table 1. 
 
Our estimated growth in the technology index is calculated as  it i dz c +  (the sector fixed 
effects, ci, capture sector specific trends, and the residual, dzit, variation of technology 
growth around its trend) and the technology index is calculated as: 
 
1(1 ) it it i it Z Zc d z − =+ +         ( 5 )  
 
We use the same approach when constructing technology indexes for the US. The growth 
rates are then taken to be BFKs estimated technology shocks, included their estimated 
constants. For both countries we set the indexes to 100 in 1971. A concern can be raised 
about the long run implications of imposing such sector specific trends. Given that such 
trends are not exactly the same across countries, in the long run there will be divergence 
rather than convergence. Our estimates are describing the developments within sample, 
and we do not claim that these necessarily can be extrapolated into infinity. For a given 
time period, industry-specific trends seems to be a reasonable assumption. By definition, 
estimation of (3) assumes that  it dz  has a mean equal to zero. As technology growth on 
average is likely to be different than zero, inclusion of the industry specific constant 
i c seems reasonable.   
 
The econometric analysis concentrates on the relationship between the domestic 
technology shocks dz and the US technology shocks dz*. The natural starting point is the 9 
 
econometric gap formulation of Cameron et al. (2005) and Cameron (2005) which 
assumes equal growth rates in the long run: 
 
11 *( * ) it i t it it it dz a b cdz d z z −− =++ + −       ( 6 )  
 
The dependent variable is specified as the growth rate dz, and it is related to the growth 
rate dz* and the lagged technology gap (z-z*). The coefficients a and b represent sector 
and year fixed effects. The estimated coefficient d measures the adjustment response to 
the gap and a negative coefficient is consistent with an equilibrium mechanism. We 
prefer the more general error correction framework: 
 
  11 ** it i t it it it dz a b cdz ez fz −− =++ + +         ( 7 )  
 
This is the standard approach to identify cointegration between the technology shocks 
and the long run relationship comes out with the coefficient –f/e. The restricted 
formulation of Cameron et al. (2005) and Cameron (2005) can be tested by adding the 
lagged foreign technology shock on level form as a separate variable compared to 
equation (6): 
 
11 1 *( * ) * it i t it it it it dz a b cdz d z z gz −− − =++ + − +       (8) 
 
A statistically significant coefficient g implies that the technology gap does not ensure a 
long run equilibrium with the same growth rates dz = dz*. A negative value of the 
coefficient g implies that that the growth rates in the long run obey dz < dz*. South 
Africa is lagging behind.  
 
The background theory models of this relationship follow the literature after Nelson and 
Phelps (1966) referred to in footnote 1 and emphasizing international technology 
spillovers, catching up, and the world technology frontier. In the case of catching up 
industrial productivity growth in South Africa is above the productivity growth in US 10 
 
industries. In the Nelson-Phelps models the long run equilibrium implies a constant 
technology gap. But the dynamics towards the long run equilibrium can be complicated 
(see in particular Benhabib and Spiegel, 2005). The dynamic path is determined by the 
initial gap, the catching up process, and shifts in barriers to international spillovers (such 
as trade policy, taxation policy and human capital).  
 
In the extension of the analysis we include the world frontier technology shocks in one-
step estimation of the production function with capital, labor, materials and capacity 
utilization. Alternative specifications are estimated on growth rate form, with and without 
the frontier technology shocks, and with added interaction between technology shocks 
and the three input variables. The interaction terms allow for an investigation of possible 
input transmission channels of technology shocks.  
 
The dominating measure of productivity in the literature is multifactor productivity. Its 
growth rate is defined as (see Vigfusson 2008, p. 50):  
 
it it it dmfpd y dx =−          ( 9 )  
 
We calculate multifactor productivity for SA and US and use them as alternative 
measures of technology. 
 
3. The relationship between technology shocks in the US and South Africa 
 
The technology shocks for South Africa are calculated based on the estimated sectoral 
production functions explained above. Four parameters are estimated representing scale 
and capacity utilization for durables and nondurables sectors. Our preferred estimates of 
the scale parameter and capacity utilization coefficient are shown in column (1) in Table 
1, and the instrumentation is reported in the footnote. The scale parameters are around 1 
and not statistically significant different from 1. The 95% confidence intervals cover 1 for 
both durables and nondurables. The capacity utilization variables are not quantitatively 
important and only statistically significant at 5% level in durables. The result does not 11 
 
change when platinum price is added as instrument in column (2). When the TIPS 
measure of capacity utilization is replaced by the energy input in column (3) and (4), 
capacity utilization has no effect on output. The scale parameters are still around 1. The 
growth shock dz is estimated as explained above, and the technology index is calculated 
using the sector fixed effects as explained in equation (4). The development of the 
measured technology shocks are documented in Appendix Table 1 and Figure 1. The 
numbers in the table and the analysis below is based on column (1) in Table 1. 
 
The development of the industrial sector technology indexes for South Africa and the US 
are shown in Figure 1. The upper panel shows durables sectors and the lower panel 
covers nondurables. The durables sectors on average have a better technology 
development in both countries. The technology growth in the US is clearly above that in 
South Africa for sectors such as furniture, machinery, instruments, food, textiles, apparel, 
printing and rubber. But there are also industrial sectors where the technology growth is 
higher in South Africa, such as primary metal, motor vehicles, chemicals and leather. The 
figure shows large variation across sectors and over time. 
 
On average the technology shock in the US industries is about 0.6% while the technology 
shock in SA is about 0.2 %. Interestingly, studies measuring the technology gap based on 
different methodology and aggregation finds that South Africa productivity is about 30 % 
of the world frontier, notably Dijk (2002). Our estimated technology shocks are in broad 
accordance with TFP calculations of South Africa by Fedderke (2001, table 8-10) and 
Edwards (2004, table 3). 
 
Table 1 about here. 
Figure 1 about here. 
 
We start the investigation of the dynamics of the relationship between the US and South 
Africa technology shocks by looking at growth rates and with various distributed lags. 
Only estimates with industry fixed effects are reported. The upper panel in Table 2 shows 
the immediate effect of the US technology shock and one year lag, the lower panel shows 12 
 
the one year lag effect of the shock and two years lag. The estimates imply that shocks in 
the US are significantly and positively correlated with technology shocks in South Africa 
with one year lag. The estimated coefficients are stable with and without year fixed 
effects and with inclusions of different lags. One percentage point technology shock in 
the US leads to about 0.15 percentage point technology shock in South Africa in the 
following year.  
 
The correlation of growth rates means that innovations in US industries have 
consequences for South Africa industries. The technology shocks are related to the world 
technology development in the same industrial sector as represented by the US industries. 
South African industries benefit from spillovers from the world frontier. The growth 
effect is limited in size, however, and the short run spillover coefficient is well below 1.  
 
Table 2 about here. 
 
The long run relationship is investigated using the error correction framework as stated in 
equation (7). The estimates of a general dynamic model with one and two lags are 
reported in Table 3. The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable shows slow 
adjustment mechanisms. The short run transmission of technology shocks with one year 
lag is consistent with the growth rate model of Table 2. There is no strong statistical 
significance of the long run relationship between the technology index series. The long 
run elasticity implied by the one year lag specification of column 1 is (0.012/0.056) about 
0.25. The long run relationship is weak and indicates divergence.  The result motivates 
further investigation of the dynamics below. 
 
Table 3 about here. 
 
The analysis of the importance of the technology gap for industrial sector productivity 
growth by Cameron et al. (2005) and Cameron (2005) includes the gap as a separate 
explanatory variable. We reach their model specification by restricting the model above 
by assuming that the lagged technology shocks in South Africa and the US have equal 13 
 
coefficients, as in equation (6). The resulting ‘gap model’ in Table 4 shows statistically 
significant gap effect with one year lag (columns 1 and 2)  and for two years lag with 
both industry and year effects. The coefficient implies slow response to the gap, about 
3% per year. For comparison, Cameron et al. (2005) find an adjustment effect of about 
10% for UK industries, and Cameron (2005) about 6-7% for Japanese industries. Our 
results also are in line with the effect of the distance to the international technology 
frontier estimated by Aghion et al. (2008) using South African data. They find that 
distance to the frontier has a positive, but weak effect on productivity growth. Distance to 
the frontier is shown to be important for total factor productivity in a panel of OECD 
countries by Vandenbussche et al. (2004).  
 
Table 4 about here. 
 
The equilibrium formulation used in the above studies of the UK and Japan can be tested 
by the more general formulation in equation (8). The results are reported in Table 5. As 
shown, the separate entry of lagged z* is statistically significant in all specification (at 
10% level). It follows that the technology gap term (z-z*) is not a valid formulation for 
the long run, the domestic and foreign technology shocks have not equal growth rate. 
This must be interpreted as a rejection of catching up and constant gap and indicates 
divergence. South Africa industries are lagging behind the US industries. 
 
Table 5 about here. 
 
Lagging behind can be understood as the result of divergence towards a low-income 
equilibrium as suggested by Benhabib and Spiegel (2004). Papageorgiou (2002) and 
Stokke (2008) elaborate possible adjustment mechanisms. We see such a poverty trap as 
unrealistic in the case of South Africa. Lagging behind is better understood as the result 
of negative shifts in barriers to technology adoption. Worsening of barriers can lead to 
slow productivity growth away from the frontier. In the literature on barriers Benhabib 
and Spiegel (2005) emphasize human capital, Parente and Prescott (1994) propose policy 
determined investment costs, and Rattsø and Stokke (2008) analyze trade policy barriers 14 
 
in a growth model of South Africa, Our results are consistent with a dynamic path away 
from a relatively low technology gap due to worsening of possibly several barriers to 
international spillovers. South Africa moves from relative high productivity in the late 
1960s and is now lagging behind and on the way to lower long run equilibrium. 
 
A one-step approach to estimating the role of the technology frontier is reported in Table 
6. The dependent variable is log growth in gross output and, as always, we include 
industry fixed effects to allow for industry-specific trends. The model formulations 
approximate error correction forms with lagged endogenous variable and interaction 
terms with the lagged frontier level are investigated. In lack of good input-specific 
instruments we use OLS. All models include as independent variables log growth rates 
and lagged log levels of capital, labour, and materials, and percentage point change and 
lagged level of capacity utilization. Column (1) presents the estimates of this basic one-
step model. The capital, labour and material coefficients are estimated to be around 0.1, 
0.3 and 0.5, respectively, suggesting a return to scale coefficient in terms of these factors 
of about 0.9, which is consistent with the scale parameter estimates obtained in Table 1. 
These estimates are not sensitive to the inclusion of the international productivity frontier.  
 
The lagged level effect of the frontier technology shock is added in column (2). The 
effect is consistent with the two-step procedure discussed above. The estimated long run 
elasticity between y and z* is (0.014/0.113) about 0.09, but not statistically significant. 
Columns (3)-(5) interact the lagged frontier technology shock with growth in the three 
different factors respectively. Statistically significant interaction between change in factor 
input and lagged frontier technology shock is estimated for materials in column (5). The 
long run elasticity between y and z* implied by this interaction is about 0.05. The 
positive interaction between frontier shock and material input indicates that the 
international spillover effect is materials saving.           
 
Table 6 about here. 
 15 
 
In Table 7 we investigate the robustness of our results by employing multifactor 
productivity mfp as dependent variable. We use the same error correction formulation as 
presented for the technology shocks in Tables 3-5, and the results are consistent with the 
estimates using technology shocks. We comment the estimates using both industry and 
year fixed effects, but also report the results without year effects. The simplest form of 
the error correction model of domestic versus foreign mfp in column (1) shows a long run 
elasticity of (0.013/0.077) about 0.2, but it is not statistically significant. When we 
reformulate the model to identify the adjustment to the technology gap (mfp-mfp*) in 
column (3), the adjustment coefficient is statistically significant and represents an 
adjustment of 4.8% per year. The effect is comparable to the results of Cameron et al. 
(2005) for the UK and Cameron (2005) for Japan. In column (5) the technology gap 
adjustment is tested by introducing a separate effect of the lagged frontier technology 
shock. The lagged technology shock is statistically significant and implies that the data 
are not consistent with an adjustment to a long run equal growth rate between the 
technology shocks of the US and South Africa. South Africa industries are lagging 
behind also as measured by multifactor productivity.  
 
Table 7 about here. 
 
The relationship between multifactor productivity and technology indexes across 
industrial sectors is shown in Appendix Figure 1. Broadly the development of technology 
shocks and multifactor productivity are fairly consistent.  
 
All in all the analysis shows that the industrial sector technology development is related 
to the technology development of the world frontier here measured by US industrial 
sectors. The industrial development cannot be understood as the result of domestic 
factors only. Analyses of changes in the coefficients over time (not reported) confirm the 
stability of the relationships estimated here. 
 
Further robustness of the parameters of scale and capacity utilization is investigated in 
various model formulations in Appendix Table 2. Column (1) presents OLS-estimations 16 
 
of our base line production function. Column (2) shows the OLS-estimates when energy 
consumption is used to represent capacity utilization and column (3) splits up dx and 
allows for estimated coefficients on materials, capital and labor. The scale effects in 
columns (1) and (2) are fairly stable for both durables and nondurables sectors. The factor 
shares estimated in column (3) are realistic, although the capital share is a bit low, a result 
that often appears in estimation of production functions. 
 
The scale effects in production are an important aspect of our methodology and the 
robustness of the results is investigated. Appendix Table 3 reports industry specific scale 
parameters. The 95 % confidence intervals of the scale parameter cover 1 for all 
industrial sectors except two. Tobacco and transportation equipment have scale 
parameters statistically significant below 1. Broadly the industrial sectors conform to the 
common models analyzed here. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
Industrial sector development must be understood in an international context. This 
proposition is analyzed using panel data for manufacturing industries in SA and the US. 
The analysis of industrial sector linkages between domestic and frontier technology 
shocks assumes that the US industries represent the world technology frontier. The 
results show that industrial performance in South Africa is related to the world 
technology frontier and consequently existing studies of technology overlooking the 
international context have omitted variable bias. We find that South Africa industries 
respond to the technology gap to the US, but that the industries are lagging behind. The 
analysis explains prolonged stagnation in this middle income country and rejects catching 
up to the frontier. 
 
Given the importance of the world technology frontier for individual country productivity 
growth, the next step is to investigate channels of technology diffusion and further 
barriers to technology adoption. The main channels of diffusion discussed in the literature 
are foreign trade and foreign direct investment. Additional barriers to human capital 17 
 
discussed are openness of the economy and policy conditions for investment. Aghion et 
al. (2008) offer an interesting analysis of economic mechanisms important for the 
relationship between trade and growth. The main challenge for further research is the 
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Table 1: Estimated scale and capacity utilization parameters 
 (1)  95%  Confidence  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 dy  Interval  dy  dy  dy 
dx  durables  0.757*** [0.327,1.186] 0.693***  0.566*  0.900*** 
 (0.219)    (0.221)  (0.315)  (0.221) 
dx non-durables  1.099**  [0.210,1.987]  1.257***  1.314***  1.147*** 
 (0.453)    (0.434)  (0.465)  (0.379) 
dU durables  0.004*  [-0.000,0.009]  0.005**     
 (0.002)    (0.002)     
dU non-durables  0.001  [-0.005,0.008]  0.000     
 (0.003)    (0.003)     
de durables        0.168  0.028 
       (0.133)  (0.093) 
de non-durables        -0.162  -0.108 
       (0.150)  (0.123) 
Observations 480    480  480  480 
R-sq 0.87    0.84  0.85  0.90 
Sargan-p 0.21  0.40  0.93  0.11 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. dy is growth in gross output, dx is a weighted sum of growth in capital, 
labor and material inputs where the respective factors’ value shares in gross output are 
used as weights. dU is change in capacity utilization as measured by TIPS. de is growth 
in electricity consumption, representing an alternative capacity utilization measure. 
Model (1) and (3) are estimated with 2SLS with the instruments: oildummy, govtdefence, 
moneyshock and goldprice in USD. In model (2) and (4), platinum price in USD are used 
as an additional instrument. Sectors that are included and which that are defined as 
durable producing and non-durable producing, can be seen from Figure 1. All models 
include industry and year fixed effects.    
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Table 2: The relationship between z and z*, growth rate form 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 dz  dz  dz  dz 
dz* 0.078  0.038  0.094*  0.056 
 (0.048)  (0.046)  (0.048)  (0.046) 
dz*(-1)     0.151***  0.162*** 
     (0.051)  (0.048) 
Industry FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Yes  No  Yes  No 
Observations 480  480  480  480 
Industries 20  20  20  20 
R-sq within  0.09  0.00  0.10  0.03 
R-sq overall  0.08  0.00  0.10  0.03 
 
 (9)  (10)  (13)  (14) 
  dz dz dz dz 
dz*(-1)  0.140*** 0.155*** 0.139*** 0.156*** 
  (0.051) (0.048) (0.051) (0.048) 
dz*(-2)     -0.009  0.002 
     (0.051)  (0.048) 
Industry  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes  No  Yes  No 
Observations 480  480  480  480 
Industries  20 20 20 20 
R-sq  within  0.10 0.02 0.10 0.02 
R-sq  overall  0.09 0.02 0.09 0.02 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Dependent variable, dz, is technology growth including sector specific 
trend in South Africa backed out from the production function estimate presented in 
column (1), Table 1. dz* is technology growth in the corresponding industry in the US, 
estimated by Basu et al. (2006).  23 
 
Table 3: Error correction model of the relationship between z and z*  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  dz dz dz dz 
dz* 0.070  0.025     
 (0.049)  (0.047)     
dz*(-1)     0.125**  0.133*** 
     (0.052)  (0.049) 
z(-1) -0.056***  -0.061***  -0.052***  -0.056*** 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
z*(-1) 0.012  0.002     
 (0.020)  (0.019)     
z*(-2)     -0.001  -0.008 
     (0.019)  (0.018) 
Industry FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  FE  Yes No Yes No 
Observations 480  480  480  480 
Industries  20 20 20 20 
R-sq  within  0.10 0.03 0.11 0.04 
R-sq  overall  0.04 0.00 0.05 0.00 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Dependent variable, dz, is technology growth including sector specific 
trend in South Africa backed out from the production function estimate presented in 
column (1), Table 1. dz* is technology growth in the corresponding industry in the US, 
estimated by Basu et al. (2006). z and z* refers to log of technology indexes 




Table 4: Restricted model, the effect of the gap between z and z*  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 dz  dz  dz  dz 
dz* 0.084*  0.044     
 (0.048)  (0.046)     
z(-1)-z*(-1) -0.035**  -0.031**     
 (0.015)  (0.015)     
dz*(-1)     0.145***  0.159*** 
     (0.051)  (0.049) 
z(-1)-z*(-2)     -0.027*  -0.023 
     (0.015)  (0.015) 
Industry FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Observations 480  480  480  480 
Industries 20  20  20  20 
R-sq within  0.10  0.01  0.10  0.02 
R-sq overall  0.05  0.00  0.07  0.01 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.  The coefficient between z and z* is here assumed to be one in the long 




Table 5: Testing the restriction of long run unit elasticity   
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  dz dz dz dz 
dz* 0.070  0.025     
 (0.049)  (0.047)     
dz*(-1)     0.125**  0.133*** 
     (0.052)  (0.049) 
z*(-1) -0.044*  -0.059***     
 (0.023)  (0.022)     
z(-1)-z*(-1) -0.056***  -0.061***    
 (0.019)  (0.019)     
z*(-2)     -0.052**  -0.064*** 
     (0.023)  (0.022) 
z(-1)-z*(-2)    -0.052***  -0.056*** 
     (0.019)  (0.019) 
Industry FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  FE  Yes No Yes No 
Observations 480  480  480  480 
Industries  20 20 20 20 
R-sq  within  0.10 0.03 0.11 0.04 
R-sq  overall  0.04 0.00 0.05 0.00 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.  The restriction of setting the coefficient between z and z* equal to one 
is tested by including z* independently. Significant coefficient on independent z* 
indicates non-valid restriction. For more details, see note Table 3.   
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Table 6: One-step estimating using capital, labor and intermediates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  dy dy dy dy dy 
y(-1)  -0.111*** -0.113*** -0.116*** -0.113*** -0.111*** 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
dk 0.106***  0.109***  -1.233  0.107***  0.108*** 
  (0.040) (0.041) (1.106) (0.041) (0.040) 
dl 0.294***  0.292***  0.292***  1.434*  0.294*** 
  (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.805) (0.040) 
dm  0.512*** 0.512*** 0.512*** 0.512***  -0.705 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.533) 
dU  0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002**  0.002*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
k(-1)  0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.006 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
l(-1)  0.039** 0.040** 0.041** 0.040** 0.039** 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
m(-1)  0.074*** 0.075*** 0.077*** 0.075*** 0.074*** 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
U(-1)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
z*(-1)    0.014 0.014 0.013 0.007 
   (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
dk  x  z*(-1)     0.288    
     (0.237)    
dl x z*(-1)        -0.242   
       (0.170)   
dm x z*(-1)          0.259** 
         (0.113) 
Industry  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  480 480 480 480 480 
Ind  20 20 20 20 20 
R-sq  within  0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 
R-sq  overall  0.76 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.76 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Dependent variable, dy, is growth in gross output, dk, dl and dm are 
growth in capital, labor and material inputs, respectively. y, k, l, m are log levels of gross 
output, capital, labor and material inputs. U is capacity utilization in percent as measured 
by TIPS. dU is change in capacity utilization in percentage points. z* log of  a technology 
index in the corresponding industry in the US, constructed by setting the 1971 value to 
100 and applying technology growth as estimated by Basu et al. (2006). All models 





Table 7: Multifactor productivity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  dmfp dmfp dmfp dmfp dmfp dmfp 
mfp(-1) -0.077***  -0.084***      
  (0.021)  (0.021)      
dmfp*  0.133*** 0.154*** 0.151*** 0.178*** 0.133*** 0.154*** 
  (0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.044) (0.046) (0.045) 
mfp*(-1) 0.013  0.013      -0.064**  -0.070*** 
  (0.023)  (0.019)    (0.028)  (0.026) 
mfp(-1)-mfp*(-1)      -0.048*** -0.043*** -0.077*** -0.084*** 
      (0.017) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) 
Industry  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  FE  Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Observations  480 480 480 480 480 480 
Industries  20 20 20 20 20 20 
R-sq  within  0.18 0.06 0.17 0.04 0.18 0.06 
R-sq  overall  0.11 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.01 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Dependent variable, dmfp, is growth in multifactor productivity, 
dmfp=dy-dx, where dy is growth in gross output and dx is weighted sum of growth in 
capital, labor and material inputs. I.e., dmfp equals the standard Solow residual. dmfp* is 
growth in US multifactor productivity defined the same way as for South Africa, using 
dy* and dx* as provided by Basu et al. (2006). mfp and mfp* are log of indexes 
constructed by setting 1971 value to 100 and applying the growth rates dmfp and dmfp*.     28 
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Note: Figures show indexes of technology for the US (Z*; 
constructed by setting 1971 value to 100 and applying technology 
growth as estimated by Basu et al. 2006) and for South Africa (Z; 
constructed in same way as Z* employing growth rates estimated in 
production function presented in Table 1). The upper panel shows 
industries defined to produce durable goods, the lower panel 
industries defined to produce non-durable goods. Sector aggregation 
and definitions of durable versus non-durable producing sectors are 
identical to Basu et al. (2006). 
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Appendix Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max
dy 480 0.0275 0.0905 -0.3530  0.3605
dk 480 0.0224 0.0571 -0.1360  0.2573
dl 480 0.0090 0.0525 -0.2314  0.2209
dm 480 0.0323 0.1411 -0.6396  0.7585
dx 480 0.0271 0.0860 -0.2873  0.3588
U 480 82.5253 6.5607 58.1730  94.8290
dU 480 -0.0409 2.9613 -9.4798  12.3000
Oildummy 480 12.0509 18.7350 0.0000  67.6612
Govtdefence 480 0.0023 0.0513 -0.1153  0.0875
Moneyshock 480 -0.1768 1.0150 -1.9934  2.3291
Gold price (usd)  480 249488 96080 60974  441663
Platinum price (usd)  480 358 145 124  677
Z 480 105.3072 14.7444 62.6658  180.7402
Z_ind 480 105.4197 15.0205 63.2350  175.2799
MFP 480 101.1867 9.6337 66.7329  148.3160
Z* 480 109.7895 18.2692 53.0803  169.2653
MFP* 480 112.6830 15.1257 87.5729  174.1080
dz 480 0.0022 0.0347 -0.1345  0.1775
dz_ind 480 0.0026 0.0301 -0.0958  0.1469
dmfp 480 0.0004 0.0313 -0.1350  0.1656
dz* 480 0.0063 0.0356 -0.1864  0.1974
dmfp* 480 0.0080 0.0329 -0.1864  0.1636
Year 480 1983.5 6.9294 1972  1995
dy is gross production, dx is aggregate of input growth, U is capacity utilization in 
percent, Z is a productivity index given the technology growth from the estimation of 
column 1 in Table 1. Z* is a productivity index given the technology shocks estimated by 
Basu et al. (2006). d in front mean first difference, small letters mean logs and _ind 
means industry-specific parameters.     30 
 
  
Appendix Table 2: Robustness checks scale and capacity utilization estimations 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 dy  dy  dy 
dx durables  0.958***  1.006***   
 (0.020)  (0.030)   
dx non-durables  0.948***  1.143***   
 (0.035)  (0.047)   
dU  durables  0.002***  0.003*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
dU  non-durables 0.002***  0.003*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
de  durables   -0.016  
   (0.016)   
de non-durables    -0.107***   
   (0.021)   
dm durables      0.531*** 
     (0.015) 
dm non-durables      0.460*** 
     (0.023) 
dk durables      0.158*** 
     (0.044) 
dk non-durables      0.056 
     (0.047) 
dl durables      0.289*** 
     (0.044) 
dl non-durables      0.328*** 
     (0.063) 
Observations 480  480  480 
R-sq 0.90  0.90  0.86 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 





Appendix Table 3: Industry specific scale parameters 
  (1)  95% Confidence  
 dy  Interval 
dx 07: Food and kindred products  0.992***  [0.598,1.385] 
 (0.201)   
dx 08: Tobacco  0.387***  [0.120,0.655] 
 (0.137)   
dx 09: Textile mill products  1.394***  [0.977,1.810] 
 (0.213)   
dx 10: Apparel  1.067***  [0.726,1.408] 
 (0.174)   
dx 11: Lumber and wood  0.847***  [0.535,1.158] 
 (0.159)   
dx 12: Furniture and fixtures  0.805***  [0.585,1.025] 
 (0.112)   
dx 13: Paper and allied  0.497  [-0.252,1.247] 
 (0.382)   
dx 14: Printing, publishing and allied  0.839***  [0.476,1.202] 
 (0.185)   
dx 15: Chemicals  0.885***  [0.357,1.413] 
 (0.269)   
dx 17: Rubber and misc plastics  1.102***  [0.753,1.452] 
 (0.178)   
dx 18: Leather  1.183***  [0.817,1.549] 
 (0.187)   
dx 19: Stone, clay, glass  0.986***  [0.583,1.390] 
 (0.206)   
dx 20: Primary metal  1.088***  [0.568,1.609] 
 (0.266)   
dx 21: Fabricated metal  1.116***  [0.787,1.446] 
 (0.168)   
dx 22: Machinery, non-electrical  1.008***  [0.817,1.200] 
 (0.098)   
dx 23: Electrical machinery  1.058***  [0.896,1.221] 
 (0.083)   
dx 24: Motor vehicles  1.077***  [0.911,1.242] 
 (0.084)   
dx 25: Transportation equipment & ordnance  0.772***  [0.602,0.943] 
 (0.087)   
dx 26: Instruments  0.809***  [0.616,1.002] 
 (0.099)   
dx 27: Misc. manufacturing  0.782***  [0.526,1.037] 
 (0.130)   
dU durables  0.002**  [0.000,0.003] 
 (0.001)   
dU non-durables  0.002  [-0.000,0.004] 
 (0.001)   
Observations 480   
R-sq 0.91   
Sargan-p 0.47   
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Scale parameters estimated freely for each sector. Capacity utilization parameter vary only between 
durable and non-durables producing sectors. See note Table 1 for more details.   
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